Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/366

352 (3) between fact of consciousness and consciousness of a fact; and (4) there are the collective and distributive uses of the word. In the phrase 'state of consciousness,' the term is used collectively. In 'content of consciousness' it may be distributive or collective. We may suspect that the more general employment of either phrase modifies the sense of subordinate terms (cognition, feeling, volition). The 'content' psychologist speaks from the standpoint of reflexion. Self-consciousness is the cognitive element in a conscious state; the state being completed by elements of feeling and action. But here is apparent the clumsiness of our terminology: "the whole is contained cognitively in what is but a part of itself existentially."

Knowledge implies (1) a subject knowing and an object known, (2) a necessary dependence of the subject on the object so far as its knowing goes, and (3) no such dependence of the subject so far as its being goes. Of the two alternatives offered, absolute limit (subject and object one), and infinite regress (the two distinct), we must, with Kant, prefer the latter.

For self-consciousness, the duality of consciousness is a fact of presentation. Let O symbolize all that is cognized or presented; S the non-O constituents. The duality of consciousness is then a name ( S' for the relation S-O. The cognition of their duality is S- -j . The ( S' ( S" infinite regress is S-O, S- -j, S-S'- -j , etc.

If feeling and activity are distinct from presentation, they belong to S, knowledge of them to O: this knowledge is first possible at ( S' S- . Two questions arise. (1) What immediacy have these elements, if not the presentative immediacy? They have that other immediacy which is necessary to this. They are the immediate being to which known being is the immediate counterpart. (2) If not known presentatively, how can they be known? Diametrically opposite conclusions have been reached (Mansel, Kant). It seems plain that, presentation and representation being ruled out, "any knowledge we have must be in some way constructive or mediate." However far such knowledge is extended, it advances by the dis- cernment of new relations, not by the acquisition of new sensations.

Let us turn to the presentationist difficulty. It is sought to be minimized by the extension of the use of 'content,' and by relegation of the 'form' of consciousness to other sciences. The psychological standpoint is treated as though essentially the same as a physical standpoint; presentationism is epistemologically absurd.