Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/365



[ABBREVIATIONS. — ''Am. J. Ps. = American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph. = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E. = International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Mon. = Philosophische Monatshefte; Phil. Stud. = Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph. = Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil. = Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph. Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn. = Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr. = Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét. = Revue de Métaphysique et Morale''. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

The founder of 'modern' psychology is Wundt; but the development of its doctrines has not been along the lines laid down by him. Wundt's theory of apperception or will (conscious activity or spontaneity) is not accepted by the Sensationalists (Associationists, Presentationists, Intellectualists), who hold that "all the elements of psychical life are primarily and ultimately cognitive elements, and that all the laws of their combination are reducible to association."

Either side has a special difficulty. That of the Presentationist "consists in the agent and the activity which thought and consciousness imply." It is met by the relegation of their consideration to another science. The opponents of Presentationism make the antithesis of subject and object essential: feeling and will are irreducible to cognitions. Then arises the problem: Do we know about them, but not know them? Or do we know them, but know nothing about them? Both statements are current.

There is (1) an ambiguity in the use of know, and (2) something akin to 'immediate knowledge' of feeling. Most psychologists recognize a difference between the immediacies of feeling and presentation. It may be one of degree (Kant, Hamilton, Horwicz, Kröner): it is more probably one of kind.

We must clear the ground by examining the term 'consciousness.' It has four senses, (1) There are the distinctions between it and self-consciousness; (2) between state and content of consciousness; Rh