Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/244

230 rated according to the exertion made in performing it. The story of the temptation of Christ shows the delicate tact which manifests itself in the formation of popular mythology. A god who had not been tempted would not arouse our admiration. An evolutionistic explanation is given of the category in question. In early stages of society, great exertions, the surrender of selfish aims, were essential to preservation, and hence valued (p. 219). In the course of time the feelings originally associated with the useful acts came to attach themselves to the exerted effort. But why any value should be set upon an external act, is as inexplicable as that it should be set upon a state of consciousness.

In his discussion of character the author seems to overshoot his critical mark. The notion of character is a mere abstraction, it is held. To refer actions to an underlying inner cause or unity called character, is like hypostasizing a notion of force (p. 269). But, when we speak of an act as the inevitable result of a man's character, we do not necessarily mean that there exists besides the psychological motives or tendencies a something behind, a unified essence, as the source and cause of conduct. All that we can mean is, that a man's actions show a certain similarity, that under certain circumstances his conduct will be of a certain kind. Where there is such similarity, we are led to seek a common ground for it. Character, in this sense, is by no means an "illusion."

Because many moralists make desert and guilt depend on freedom, Dr. Simmel makes freedom depend on desert (p. 286). Such paradoxical utterances do not assist one's understanding of the questions under consideration. But in other respects this short treatment of free-will is perfectly just in its determinism. A number of impulses struggle for mastery. The victorious tendency we afterward identify with the real 'I.' Yet the 'I' is not a power over and above the different tendencies; it is the whole of consciousness. "We should have no idea either of desert or guilt, or of freedom, if there were no conflict."

The last chapter deals at length with the concept of happiness. The author carefully analyzes the view that pleasure is the sole end of life, and reveals the inconsistencies of the happiness-theory as well as the opposition of some of its tenets to the moral consciousness. I cannot refrain from selecting some of the many good points in his argument. The fact that the performance of a moral act is accompanied by pleasure, does not warrant the conclusion that pleasure is the cause of the act. Such a conclusion would be