Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/220

206 a process. To the view, on the other hand, which seeks all reality in Thought, Becoming, and all that becomes, reality, time and motion, form a mystery which "experience obliges" it to admit, but which the timeless and changeless inter-relations of its own data can never hope to explain.

In conclusion I must draw attention to Mr. Ritchie's claim (p. 200) that the admission of individuality as an ideal necessarily leads "to the conclusion that in the truest and fullest sense there can be only one perfectly real individual." This claim throws a lurid light on the facility with which "Neo-Kantians" hypostasize their epistemology. It so astounds me that I hardly dare to ask, why ideals are necessarily monopolies, to be enjoyed only by single persons. Once more we are left face to face with that weird transition from a logical category to a metaphysical reality, over a gulf, which, in spite of all challenges (p. 536), no Greenian ever deigns to bridge, and which, I grieve to say, separates me from Mr. Ritchie a thousand times more impassably than does the broad Atlantic.

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