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204 have discussed the intricate problems to which it gives rise less superficially, and explained what exactly are the limitations of his three tests, and how exactly he conceives them to work together. I may say, however, that, doubtless owing to my brevity, he misses the point of my 'foot-note' (p. 537). The absurdity he ascribes to me is one which his own treatment involves. He had denied 'reality' to dreams, because of their incoherence in the (ex post facto) judgment and (imperfect) memory of waking consciousness. What he overlooked was the breach of continuity awaking involves. So I denied that the incoherence of dreams existed for the dream-consciousness, and that their condemnation by waking consciousness was relevant, unless he could show that the coherence of 'waking' life could survive a similar breach of continuity – such as that of death. It was not I, but his argument, that referred the assertion (or denial) of reality to an extraneous standard.

As to the obscure art of ghost-seeing, I am sorry to have to dispute Mr. Ritchie's facts. If he refers to the evidence (Proc. Psychical Research Soc., vol. vi., pp. 279-80) he will find that it sometimes does happen that "one of the company sees a ghost distinctly, others see it dimly, and others again not at all."

Mr. Ritchie tries to turn the edge of my objection that every new experience must conflict with previous experience, by denying that the experiences conflict, though their interpretations may. I should have thought he would have been the first to admit how great is the infusion of theory in our 'facts of experience,' and how impossible it is to get down to bare facts.

The question raised on p. 198 as to the theoretic value of a practical test, involves, it seems to me, the crucial parting of the ways between scientific and philosophic Evolutionism. Mr. Ritchie thinks that "to suppose an ultimate discrepancy between practical value and speculative truth implies philosophic scepticism," and proposes to guarantee our mental processes by their practical efficacy. I think he is, very possibly, right. But neither can we assert his principle, without a metaphysical faith that the course of evolution