Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/109

1.] excluded from the aesthetic field in its widest sense, as it is shown to exist in the experience of the race. On the other hand, there seem to be for each individual certain pleasures which he does exclude from his own aesthetic field. Why or how this separation is made, is a question which hedonistic aesthetics must answer. It would appear that what is permanently pleasurable in revival (relatively speaking) is termed aesthetic, and that what is not thus permanent is termed non-aesthetic. The revivals to which the name 'pleasure' still clings, but which are not pleasant in themselves, appear to be what we cast out as non-aesthetic. But if each individual pleasure is ephemeral, the pleasure revival must be the same. The aesthetic field, then, must be changeable; it must alter with those conditions that render variable the nature of the revivals we are to find pleasurable. This appears actually to be the case. While the hedonist in aesthetics is compelled to abandon absolutism, he is not at a loss for a standard. The logical hedonist turns from his own to an objective field, i.e., that of the highly cultivated man as he conceives him. Of course this standard is only relatively stable. M. shows that if the above position be correct, we are enabled to account for the genesis of many aesthetic theories which have been defended in the past. Incidentally it has appeared that the theoretic opposition to hedonic treatment of aesthetics has been increased, if not occasioned, by an incorrect and inadequate view as to the nature of pleasure-pain, held by aesthetic theorists. A most fruitful lesson is to be learned from this whole discussion, viz., a lesson of liberality. We come to see the futility of attempting to force standards upon others. In the next article M. will attempt to show that aesthetic practice conforms with the principles relating to pleasure-pain which have been already enumerated.

E. A.

The object of this article is merely to attempt a classification of the different types of character. R. neglects the history of the subject, which would be long and monotonous. Two principal theories have been held: one physiological, the other psychological. The former is practically the classic doctrine of the four 'temperaments,' though this has often been modified in its minor details. The latter is more recent, and appears to be of English origin. R. begins by attempting to establish the most general conditions of the determination of characters. There are two fundamental manifestations of the psychic life: feeling and action. We have, then, two great classes, les sensitifs and les actifs. (1) Les sensitifs are to be distinguished by the exclusive predominance