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528 until after an adequate examination of its philosophical implications. Here the object is merely to indicate the way in which Schopenhauer adapts Kant's doctrines of freedom and of the empirical and the intelligible character to his own purposes, so as to justify his own sharp distinction between the will-impelled egoistic conduct, and the self-renunciation of the ethical hero free from the bonds of will. Schopenhauer's moral genius, like Kant's, has transcended the limits of phenomena. Only Kant believes he has found morality in the austere adherence to the demands of the moral law; Schopenhauer, in the self-denying love characterizing all truly sympathetic conduct. This, then, is the real difference between Kant's conception of morality and Schopenhauer's. Kant's is the ethics of imperative reason; Schopenhauer's, the ethics of compassionate feeling. Each, in its own way, illustrates tendencies normally present in human nature. Kant's morality is the morality of the Hebraic spirit which deified law; Schopenhauer's, the morality of oriental meditation, the ethics of Jesus of Nazareth.

Now, morality concerns all of human nature, and any attempt to exhaust its significance by deifying any one of its aspects is doomed to failure. Schopenhauer readily sees the narrowness of Kant's conception of morality, and it is a sorry picture that he draws of Kant's moral hero: "If, by a strong effort of the imagination, we try to picture to ourselves a man, possessed, as it were, by a dæmon, in the form of an absolute Ought, that speaks