Page:Philosophical Review Volume 19.djvu/256

242 only to be obtained by the same methods which have accomplished so much in the sphere of the special sciences.

This view carries with it the corollary that the border line between science and philosophy is indistinct, and that the completely unified knowledge of philosophy is an ultimate ideal rather than an accomplishment of his own or of any other system. All metaphysical problems and speculations Spencer explicitly excluded from the purview of philosophy, properly so called, and, whether or no we agree with such a limitation, we must not forget to estimate his work in the light of his own object and aim.

Spencer considered that he had found some genuine clues which would aid in unravelling the complexity of all orders of phenomena. These are contained in the second part of First Principles, a work which has been the subject of the most extreme and diverse criticisms. One extreme is found in the little volume by Mr. Hector Macpherson, who heads his chapter dealing with this work—"The Cosmos Unveiled," while others, whom it is not necessary to mention by name, have denounced the author as a pretentious word-builder, ignorant both of science and of philosophy, whose conclusions are practically valueless. The latter view is completely answered by even the most modest estimate of the influence of Spencer's work on the special branches of knowledge with which he dealt. To what extent the former may be justified is the question with which this essay is concerned.

In the first place, it is desirable to separate one aspect of the question which is liable to be lost in the discussion of more controversial details. None at the present day can doubt that, in all orders of phenomena, there are to be found some common factors. This is one of the commonplaces of chemistry and physics. That it may be possible to formulate a more complete unification is an idea not peculiar to modern philosophy, but one which, in the light of our present knowledge, has found