Page:Philosophical Review Volume 14.djvu/539

523 And, vague as they are, they bring out the different interests which lie at the basis of ethical and of metaphysical inquiry, and give a preliminary point of view for discussing the relation of ethics to metaphysics.

This discussion may perhaps be blocked at the outset by the assertion that the two subjects of inquiry have no relation to one another: that 'good is good,' and 'reality is reality,' and that there is nothing more to be said. This view I will not discuss at length. It is better worth while to attempt to show the relation of two things than to refute the denial of their being related at all. No such denial can be admitted as having a right either to block investigation or to prejudice its results; and this for several reasons: In the first place, the distinction of goodness and reality with which we start has not been shown to be an ultimate distinction; and even if it were to turn out to be an ultimate distinction, a distinction between concepts does not imply that they are without relation; and the relation of these concepts is at least a legitimate problem for philosophy. In the second place, the distinction as stated, involves a relation: the term 'good' is often used as synonymous with the term 'ought to be,' and it at least implies an 'ought to be'; it implies, therefore, a relation to possible or to conceivable reality. In the third place, if what is conceived as good is in any way or to any extent real, or can in any way or to any extent be realized, it follows that 'reality' and 'goodness' are not absolutely sundered: the good may be realized, reality may be moralized; ethics and metaphysics are not entirely separate and independent spheres of investigation. When we proceed to inquire, into the relation of ethics to metaphysics, we may either start with metaphysical conceptions,—conceptions about reality, that is,—and note the point at which we pass over to ethical conceptions, or we may start with ethical conceptions and consider how it is possible or logical to pass from them to conceptions about reality. The former is the method of the metaphysical moralists; the latter, the method of the ethical metaphysicians. From whichever point we start, we