Page:Philosophical Review Volume 14.djvu/48

32 objective or real, not even subjects themselves, we have a world, in which all is objective, and whatever is, is real.

I believe that this realistic view of the world has much to commend it, both from the standpoint of common sense and from that of science; but before considering its implications, it will be proper to examine the reasons on which Hume explicitly bases his rejection of it. Hume's first argument for the ideality of perceived objects is given in the following passages. "We may observe, that there are three different kinds of impressions conveyed through the senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second those of colors, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures that arise from the application of objects to our bodies. ... Both philosophers and the vulgar, again, esteem the third to be merely perceptions; and consequently interrupted and dependent beings. Now 'tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colors, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity. ... 'Tis also evident, that colors, sounds, etc., are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire. ... Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence" (pp. 482-3). This Berkeleyan argument is, it seems to me, the least sophistic of the various attempts to prove the subjectivity of perceived objects. We may restate the demonstration thus: Feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness are admittedly subjective. An unconscious pleasure, a pleasure which no one is aware of, is inconceivable. The less we are aware of pleasantness and unpleasantness, the less there is of those qualities. In the case of feeling-tone, esse is obviously percipi. That consciousness directly testifies to the subjectivity of feelings is made more apparent by contrasting feelings with cognitive qualities, such as color and figure. Redness and triangularity are not felt to diminish in reality when our attention to them diminishes. A triangle which is faintly perceived is no less triangular than one