Page:Philosophical Review Volume 14.djvu/35

19 is by common consent held to be covered by the catagories of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. This common consent seems surely to imply that each of the three is independent of the other two, although all are bound together in one group. And if this is true, then the claim of the æsthetic realist can surely not be correct.

But this claim will not be overthrown by any reference to such a generalization as that above mentioned. The claim of the æsthetic realist is based upon what he feels to be clear evidence founded upon experience; and he cannot be answered unless we are able to show him what is the basis for his ready conviction that truth and beauty are one and identical; and what is the true relation between the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. And these problems, which are in our day of vital importance to the artist, the philosopher alone can answer.

In my view some aid in the solution of this problem may be gained from the examination of the meaning of our terms. From this study I feel convinced that we must hold that, when we speak of the True, and the Good, and the Beautiful, as mutually exclusive as above, we use the term 'true' in a narrow sense. On the other hand, 'the True' is often used in a broader sense, as equivalent to 'the Real.' This being so, we may say that the Beautiful is 'the Real' as discovered in the world of impression; the relatively permanent pleasure which gives us the sense of Beauty being the most stable characteristic of those parts of the field of impression which interest us. We may also assert that the Good is 'the Real' as discovered in the world of expression, i.e., of impulse, which is due to the inhibited capacity for expression, and the reaction of the Self in its efforts to break down the inhibition. And in the same way we may conclude that the True (using the term in the narrow sense) is 'the Real' as discovered in the realm of experience exclusive of impression or expression.