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219 of scientific or philosophical theory as of "the ideas and the triumphs, scientific and material, of the preceding generation." "Perhaps the greatest danger of the new social order is the growing materialization of the mental outlook. ... This age like others—perhaps more than most—is strewn with the victims of the struggle. But it can also boast a product largely its own—the new race of victors who have emerged triumphant, with wealth beyond the dreams of the avarice of the past generation. Their interests make them cosmopolitan; they are unrestained by the traditional obligations of ancient lineage; and the world seems to lie before them as something to be bought and sold. Neither they nor others have realized as yet the power which colossal wealth gives in modern conditions. And it remains to be seen whether the multimillionaire will claim to figure as Nietzsche's 'over-man,' spurning ordinary moral conventions, and will play the rôle, in future moral discourses, which the ethical dialogues of Plato assign to the 'tyrant.'"

In the second and third lectures Mr. Sorley investigates the claims of scientific and philosophic theory to throw light upon the ethical problem, taking up in turn the theory of Evolution and the theory of Idealism. The former discussion is a remarkably fresh and convincing restatement of the views already developed at greater length in the Ethics of Naturalism. The author first distinguishes three different views, as held by the evolutionists themselves, regarding the ethical significance of evolution. "In the first place, there is the view of Darwin that natural selection is a criterion of moral fitness only up to a certain stage, and that the noblest part of man's morality is independent of this test; in the second place, there is the view of Huxley that morality is entirely opposed to the cosmic process as ruled by natural selection; and, in the third place, there is the view of Nietzsche that the principles of biological development (variation, that is to say, and natural selection) should be allowed free play so that, in the future as in the past, successful variations may be struck out by triumphant egoism." He then proceeds to account for these divergent interpretations of the ethical significance of evolution by distinguishing "three very different kinds of struggle or competition," to all of which indifferently the conception of evolution by natural selection is applied by evolutional moralists: (1) competition between individuals, resulting in the selection of the self-assertive qualities; (2) competition between groups, favoring qualities implying self-restraint and even self-sacrifice on the part of the individual; (3) competition between ideas and institutions, including habits and