Page:Philosophical Review Volume 14.djvu/18

2 which must in the end determine the nature of the problems to be studied by the æsthetician, and the import of the solutions of the problems which are thus presented for our consideration.

We live in what may well be called the era of psychological development, an era marked by the recognition of the truth that no philosophical view of life can be adequate which does not take full account of the experience of the individual human spirit which interprets this life. And so quite naturally for ourselves, and in all probability quite in accord with the habit of thought of the immediate future, we begin our study by the consideration of the relation of Æsthetics to Psychology. In turning for light to Psychology, the æsthetician finds himself of course asking what is the nature of the states of mind related to his inquiry; and here at once he finds himself confronted with a distinction which must be made, if a correct æsthetic doctrine is to become established. He notes that there is a sharp difference between (1) the mental attitude of an artist who produces works of beauty, and (2) the mental attitude of a man at the moment when he appreciates beauty in his experience. The failure to note this distinction has in my view led to much confusion of thought among the æstheticians of the past, and to the defense of dogmas which otherwise would not have been maintained.

That this distinction is an important one becomes clear in the fact that the sense of beauty is aroused in us by objects in nature which bear no relation to what men call 'fine art.' The mental state of the appreciator of beauty has therefore a breadth that does not belong to the mental state which accompanies, or leads to, the production of works of beauty by the artist.

And yet it should not surprise us that this distinction has so often been overlooked; for the theorists first follow the trend of thought of the uncritical man, and this uncritical man does not naturally make the distinction referred to.