Page:Philosophical Review Volume 14.djvu/105

89 formed, language rather makes possible the attainment of these general and abstract ideas: we think because we speak, rather than speak because we think. There are many indications that language is a product of the subconscious rather than the rational phase of the human intellect, and that the designs of its structure and the abstractions of its categories exist only in posse until they are discovered and formulated by the philologist. Primitive peoples are found who are unaware of the existence of the grammatical structure of their language, and are unable to understand it, much less to contrive and elaborate it. In view of these facts, it is bidding defiance to psychology to expect that a knowledge of the generalizations of philologists can affect or even facilitate the transfer and use of linguistic symbols and forms. The use of the arbitrary memory in learning language is proper enough, provided the effort be spent on the speech itself, instead of upon generalizations regarding its formal structure.

The ethics of to-day seems to demand an external authority and more objective principles, as opposed to its former independent and purely rational basis. It is becoming more an application of science, based on psychology, sociology, and biology. The biological standpoint is represented by Metchnikoff's Études sur la nature humaine. The author treats from an optimistic standpoint the art of being happy, but his optimism lies only in his view of science, not of nature. Nature for him is blind and indifferent; there is no universal harmony in a provident God and benevolent nature, as formerly believed. The law of selection only states the minimum of adaptation necessary for the bare existence of the species. Nature does not progress or complete her work; we find no approximation to perfect adaptation in any species. Man, too, is an animal and subject to the general conditions of nature. He is ever tormented by its lack of harmony; he is ever subject to sickness, old age, and death. These ills have formed the problems of religion and philosophy. Perhaps modern science can do more to find a solution; for it struggles directly with disease, and tries to correct and perfect nature. Now old age is merely a disease; with the advance of science, based on the microbe theory, we may hope for the elimination of its infirmities, and trust that death will only come after a life prolonged to its normal length. Death, too, may be robbed of its sting by the eclipse of the will to live. Such a life and death is the end of existence. In seeking the perfect adaptation of man, science solves the moral problem. Let us look at some criticisms of this view. The power of science is no doubt great, but man's environment is not necessarily fixed. New physical conditions may arise too powerful even for medicine to overcome. Man's social environment, his city and industrial life under artificial conditions, also complicate the