Page:Philosophical Review Volume 13.djvu/670

656 confirmed libertine, to whom the pursuit of his prey seems the natural occupation of a gentleman? What of the insensate bigot, to whom persecution of the unbeliever is a holy task and a delight? Shall we say of these men that because their conduct meets with no condemnation in their own eyes, we also must hold them innocent? Because they believe that what they do is right and proper, have we therefore no motive to correct their conduct? If the formally good is the morally good, why not let ignorance enjoy its bliss and depravity rest comfortably in its congenial sty? A further, but still partial, answer is to be found in the fact that men live in such social union that the conduct of each individual is in various degrees subject to check and correction by his fellows, and the acquiescence of one man in the conduct of another is part and parcel of his own conduct. The act which is formally but not materially right is not only an occasion for present and later reflection by the agent, but concerns his associates also; and, however they may concede its formal rightness, their concern is none the less to prevent its repetition. I am so far my brother's keeper, his conduct is so far my conduct, that it is formally right for me to endeavor—by such means as expediency may dictate—to keep him from doing material wrong. Public opinion thus constitutes an external standard of rightness, to which, in general, a man is somewhat narrowly bound. If his ethical sentiments are extraordinary, he may expect to have his personal liberty forcibly curtailed. Furthermore, where the possibility of instruction exists, no unimportant part of the conduct of a man is made up of the lessoning in morals which he gives to those who are under his influence; and in the performance or negligence of the duties thus involved, he is subject to his own moral judgment. We may say, therefore, that the content of another man's moral ideal is not indifferent to me, because, and in so far as, it lies within the sphere of my own conduct.

But the question remains: Are such men as we have described subject to our adverse moral judgments; or does our reaction to their misdeeds stop short with instruction and forcible interference? The answer concerns the place of knowledge in the