Page:Philosophical Review Volume 13.djvu/365

351 The use of the term ' natural ' is also somewhat irritating to the student who is familiar with the ambiguities in that term and with the controversies which have raged. To him it does not seem "a paradox that the artificial is superior to the natural," if by natural we mean what is devoid of intelligence. Nor does it seem important to argue that all faculties have a natural origin, if we use the term nature as comprehending all experience. But, at the same time, such an account of the origin of perception and reason as is found on pp. 477 ff. will be far from satisfactory. 'Perception of relations,' which is here made so easy, involves far more complex processes than are here suggested. Numerous other illustrations could be given of what to the student of philosophy and psychology must appear as instances of explanations which ignore the difficult points of the problem. The psychology of the book will in general be likely to serve a purpose by provoking the psychologist to give fuller treatment to genetic problems, rather than as a positive solution.

"One main object of this book," says the author, may "be expressed by slightly changing one of Kant's famous titles. I have endeavored to write 'Prolegomena to any future Ethics that can possibly pretend to be scientific'" (p. ix).

Fortunately for the reviewer, Mr. Moore has made the task of presenting the fundamental theses advocated by him an easy matter, for at the end of each chapter one finds an adequate summary of the preceding discussions. By quoting these summaries the reviewer can therefore put the reader in possession of the contents of the book. As most of the points urged cannot be debated without occupying more space than a review puts at one's command, there will be no attempt to criticise the positions taken by the author. Many of them seem to be extremely questionable, and the arguments employed to support them are often more ingenious and subtle than convincing, but this is not the place to canvass them satisfactorily.

At the close of the first chapter, which deals with "The Subject-Matter of Ethics," Mr. Moore tells us that he has "endeavoured to enforce the following conclusions. (1) The peculiarity of Ethics is not that it investigates assertions about human conduct, but that it investigates assertions about that property of things which is denoted by the