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333 continuing process in which both animal instinct and the sense of duty have their place" (p. 119). True, we know that such a process has throughout vast ages been going on; and we catch glimpses of it at various points in its development. But the record is fearfully imperfect, except of the very latest stages. In particular, of the transition from brute to savage, we have very little precise knowledge. Perhaps this is all that Professor Dewey means by the revelation of a "single continuous process"; but, if so, we must yet remember that, for purposes of scientific analysis, the fact that A has developed from B does not suffice for much; we must have definite knowledge of closely consecutive stages of the development. Such knowledge of a vast period of the history of moral origins we do not possess, and seemingly can never possess,—eke out our ignorance, as we may, by comparative and child psychology.

In his second paper, Professor Dewey discusses the relation of the method of evolution to the theories of intuitionalism and empiricism. There would seem, at the outset, to be no necessary incompatibility of the method with either theory. In the first place, as to intuitions, the question whether we possess any mental states that deserve such a name is one to be settled by immediate reference to present facts; the theory of evolution has nothing directly to do with the matter. And, in the second place, the philosophical doctrine of empiricism, whether false or true, operates on a level of thought where it could hardly come into conflict with a biological or sociological generalization. An associational interpretation of the evolution of mental phenomena is no more impossible than an atomistic interpretation of the evolution of a world-system.

But Professor Dewey attacks the situation on a different side. It is the epistemological value of supposed intuitions that he questions. "The mere existence of a belief, even admitting that as a belief it cannot in any way be got rid of, determines absolutely nothing regarding the objectivity of its own content. The worth of the intuitions depends upon genetic considerations" (p. 357). But upon what, we may ask, has rested the validity of ordinary sense-perception? Of course, the survival value is evident; but did man have to wait for the theory of psychophysical evolution to give him a warrant for an abiding faith in the evidence of his senses? It is their present functional value apart from all questions of origin, that is the direct and sufficient evidence of their trustworthiness. What is definitely known to-day as