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634 such laws; but the legislative reformer and the practical statesman desirous of avoiding the evils resulting from the presence of such laws in the code, urges their repeal. Science suggests procedure, but the demand for procedure is not made by knowledge, but by will; not by unimpassioned science, but by strong clamant desires for certain objects. Science sets the objects before us and discloses the means by which they can be secured; but unless, when means and end are thus set before us, our affections and desires rise up and set the machinery of will to work, there can be no imperative issued. Jurisprudence, then, does not lay down laws; it merely sets forth facts, and men's likings and dislikes for these facts prompt them to action. But the facts which jurisprudence sets forth are facts in connection with rules of conduct. It is normative in the sense that it is a science which deals descriptively with norms.

What is true of jurisprudence is true also of ethics. Ethics did not create morality, nor does it legislate to moral beings better moral laws. It describes the various types of morality and the results flowing severally from these types. But it is not imperious or dictatorial. It does not command men everywhere to repent, to reform their ideals and better their habits. It merely says: "There are various ways of behaving observable among men, and others conceivable. These various ways have these respective characteristics and consequences." If a man says, "In defiance of these consequences, I will to conduct myself in this way," ethics is unconcerned, for ethics is systematic knowledge, and knowledge as mere knowledge is equally hospitable to every existent fact and to every law of connection. As Huxley, I think it was, once remarked, the fiercest cataclysms of nature, the wreck of matter and the crash of worlds, are as orderly occurrences and as beautiful illustrations of the laws of nature as the sabbatical peace of a summer sea. So are human folly and madness and immorality as much ethical phenomena to be treated by the science of ethics as are moral walk and conversation. But ethics does and can say to the immoral, "Your conduct is mischievous and detestable to those of your fellows who are normal,"—which again is a purely descriptive statement.