Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/646

630 operas or oratorios or songs. The musical artist, on the contrary, as artist, does not care for these laborious productions of the scientist, except in so far as they may perhaps enable him to attain some artistic effect he is striving after. His productions are melodies and symphonies. He makes music; the musical scientist knows music. The motives actuating these two persons are very different. The scientist is prompted by love for the true, the artist by a love for the beautiful. Very frequently, as in the case of music, the scientist studies what the artist produces. Indeed, every art forms or may form the subject matter of a science. Thus the art of building has given rise to the science of architecture, and the art of linguistic expression to such various sciences as rhetoric, etymology, syntax, prosody, phonetics, poetics. But not every science has a corresponding art; thus the science of palæontology, which is concerned with fossils, has no art corresponding to it, for the reason that the facts which palæontology studies are not produced by human agency. Men discover, they do not make, genuine fossils. For our present purpose, we may classify all objects of scientific investigation into two distinct groups, one including all objects of human production and achievement, the other including objects not brought about by human agency. The sciences which deal with objects of the first group have correlated arts; those which deal with objects of the second group have not.

While in the latter there is no danger of confusing art with science,—for the very good reason that there is no art present to lead to confusion,—in the former case confusion is frequent. A base-ball pitcher is said to be 'scientific' in his curves, when, as a matter of fact, he is not scientific at all. He 'knows how' to do it, but he does not know why he does it so. In this case an art is called a science. Often the mistake is the other way round; that is, a science is called an art. For instance, logic is quite generally recognized now as a science and not an art, and yet not long ago perhaps the majority of writers on logic insisted on calling it an art. This was because correct thinking is an art, and it was uncritically assumed that therefore a knowledge of the methods of correct thinking must also be an art. The object of