Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/577

No. 5.] consider Spinoza's doctrine of 'Intuition,' and of intellectual love towards God, that he believed that 'blessedness'—perhaps of a higher and more adequate type—could be attained by the independent power of individual reason. This path is exceedingly difficult, and there are few, he admits, who are capable of following it. The generality of men are led by their passions; nevertheless it is possible for the philosophical thinker to control his passions and be guided by an emotion that is not a passion, but is the result of complete insight and perfected activity. Mr. Duff's treatment of this point seems to me the least satisfactory part of his very able and suggestive book. I have dwelt on this point at some length, because it seems to indicate a radical departure from the current way of interpreting Spinoza. Notwithstanding my opinion that a very important element of Spinoza's thought has been completely ignored, I cannot help feeling that Mr. Duff's book is of the highest importance, and takes rank at once with the best work that has appeared in the Spinoza literature. The author shows not merely an external familiarity with the text, but also proves that he has the ability to bring things together and exhibit points in their systematic relations. The book, however, is a long one (over five hundred, closely printed, large octavo pages), and gives (at least on first reading) an impression of diffuseness and some unnecessary repetition. It would be an advantage if the results of the various discussions were more frequently summed up at the end of the chapters. The first half of the work deals with Spinoza's psychological analysis of human nature, as preparatory to a comprehension of the ethical and social theories which he erects upon this foundation. In this connection we have chapters dealing with "Man's Place in Nature," "Natural Necessity and Freedom of Will," "Unity and Difference," "Divine Determination," "The 'Conatus sese conservandi' and the Good," "Nature and Defects of the Passions," "Place and Function of Reason." Then follow chapters on "The Good as an Ideal Human Nature," "The Good as the Principle of Sociality," "The 'Jus Naturæ,'" "The 'Status Naturalis' and the Natural Man," "God's Laws and Human Laws," "The Fundamental Laws of Human Nature," "The Problem of Evil," "The 'Lumen Naturale' and the Idea of God in Man." The remaining chapters deal more directly with Spinoza's political theories and discuss the necessity, origin, powers, and functions of the State, and the various forms of political constitutions. The psychological chapters omit, as we have already mentioned, to take account of Spinoza's doctrine of Intuition, or to carry on the discussion to the fifth part of the Ethics. Apart from