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340 "Emotion must be regarded as an ultimate aspect of mind with a distinctive influence on conduct" (p. 73). The interest now centers in "the manner in which emotion functions as a principle of activity." In order to determine this, Dr. Irons finds it expedient first to ascertain the primary emotions, or the "qualitatively distinct forms which feeling-attitude assumes." "The primary emotions seem to be the following: satisfaction, dissatisfaction; anger; fear; ill-feeling and its opposite; repugnance; scorn, admiration; respect, contempt" (p. 106). As factors in conduct, the fundamental 'feeling-attitudes' "regulate the behavior of the individual in regard to the varying phases of the world of things, persons, and events, which constitutes his environment" (p. 106). "All these emotional tendencies to action are distinct from the hedonic impulses. Whatever be the conditions under which an emotion arises, it prompts to activity apart from all considerations of hedonic consequences" (p. 108).

What evidence is there to establish the existence of primary tendencies to action? If it be granted that such tendencies exist prior to the experience of the hedonic consequences of action, then it is possible to maintain that the end of conduct may not be pleasure. It is at this point that Dr. Irons's theory of emotion makes its greatest contribution to ethics. "In various ways," he says, "the existence of primary tendencies can be established. From the concrete phenomena of emotion and pleasure-pain, as well as from more general considerations in regard to the nature of human interests, the same conclusion follows" (p. 119).

Emotion is a reaction. "Emotion is the manner in which we react" (p. 14). It is self-evident that there can be no reaction unless certain tendencies already exist in that which reacts. If the tabula rasa hypothesis were true, the mind might passively receive, but could not react. Emotion, then, presupposes primary tendencies to action. The phenomena of pleasure-pain in a similar manner lead to the conclusion that primary tendencies exist. "The pleasures which are supposed to condition those tendencies are themselves conditioned by the latter. If there were no tendency, and therefore no desire, for effective manifestation of the self, success in this respect would not be pleasant. The attainment of success is pleasant because it is desired; it is not desired because it is pleasant " (p. 115).

Similarly the facts of interest point to the existence of primary tendencies to action. "Interest in objects is not determined exclusively by hedonic relations" (p. 113). For example, the interest which is excited by the sight of another in distress cannot be attributed