Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/355

No. 3.] considering qualitative distinctions in emotions, he says : "In a case like this, as Külpe maintains, it is to introspection that the final appeal must be made" (p. 19). "Introspective observation," as Professor James says, "is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always." (Psychology, Vol. I, p. 185). But to what extent is it trustworthy? Must we, with Professor James, admit that "introspection is no sure guide to truths about our mental states"? (Ibid., Vol. I, p. 197.) May we accept with unquestioning faith the report of introspection so far as it relates to the 'that,' but accept with reserve what it reports about the 'what' of a psychical state? Whatever our final opinion of the reliability of this method may be, we cannot withhold our admiration and gratitude for this acute and thorough analysis of emotion as it appears to introspection. For here, at least, "in multitude of counsellors there is safety." Dr. Irons' s theory of emotion is too familiar to the readers of this to make it necessary to state his argument at length. The appeal to introspection, the comparison of emotion with cognition, with pleasure-pain, and with conation, and the critical review of current theories convince him that emotion must be regarded "as an ultimate aspect of mind." "The final result of this whole discussion regarding the nature of emotion is now evident. Emotion is not only introspectively distinct from cognition, pleasure-pain, and conation, but has, in addition to its unique character as a conscious fact, definite conditions of its own and other features absolutely peculiar to itself. It is, therefore, unanalyzable and irreducible, and must be regarded as an ultimate and primary aspect of mind (p. 39). A review ot current theories " discloses the fact that emotion is not usually identified with pure cognition, pleasure-pain, or conation." While psychologists usually admit that emotion differs in some respects from other aspects of mind, they attempt in various ways to explain away this difference. " The difference between emotion and the other aspects of mind has not been successfully explained away" (p. 72).

What is the nature of emotion? "I have used the term 'feeling-attitude' to indicate, not to define, this apparently unique aspect of mind. The word 'feeling' expresses subjectivity and diffusedness. Emotion is subjective in much the same sense as pleasure-pain. It is a centrally-initiated reaction, however, while the latter is pure subjectivity. Briefly, the one is subjectivity as reaction; the other is subjectivity as receptivity. The word 'attitude' is employed to mark this distinction and to emphasise the fact that emotion, in virtue of its character as reaction, has an outward direction or objective reference" (p. 7).