Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/353

v The critics of Hedonism, in their psychological introductions to ethics, usually devote much attention to the theory of desire that identifies its object with pleasure; for they see that such a theory almost inevitably leads to Hedonism. Dr. Irons joins issue on a broader question.

The hedonistic theory of conation regards "pleasure-pain as the source and end"—"the alpha and omega of all activity." "This doctrine is an integral part of the general view of mind originated by Locke and rigorously developed by Condillac. It is the tabula rasa theory applied to conation" (p. 122). Dr. Irons assails the Presentationistic' explanation of conation, not for the express purpose of rendering the Hedonist uncomfortable, but to prepare the way for "an adequate treatment of the principles of conduct." Yet, he points out that, if Presentationism be "carried out to its logical conclusion, it leaves no room for pleasure-pain any more than for conation (p. xvii). Equally fatal to Hedonism is the alternative theory which he advances. For he finds that "emotion prompts to activity apart from all considerations of hedonic consequences"; that "there are principles of activity which are demonstrably not hedonic" (p. 108); that the " primary tendencies spring from the very nature of the individual" ... and "tend to assert themselves ... regardless of consequences, and therefore without reference to hedonic results" (p. xvi).

Presentationism is the natural consequence of the undue prominence given to the psychology of cognition and the neglect of the emotional and volitional aspects of the mind. Cognition received more than its fair share of attention because of its importance for metaphysics. Locke appealed to psychology for a satisfactory theory of knowledge to enable him to lay his metaphysical doubts. The 'Mental Philosophy' of an earlier generation is a strange medley of psychology and metaphysics, in which writer and reader pass and repass from one to the other, unconscious of differences in problems and methods. In recent years, the intellectualistic bias, shown in the undue prominence given to the psychology of cognition, "has received support and encouragement from the spread of experimental psychology, since cognition lends itself most readily to experimental treatment" (p. xi). Presentationism, sanctioned by history and fostered by a scientific psychology, presents a formidable front to the champion of a different theory of conation.

Logical Presentationism assumes but one irreducible mental element, sensation. Pleasure-plain is simply one among other