Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/352

336 of empirical values. Otherwise, objectivity seems to be left hanging in the air. A further metaphysical development is implied in Professor Rickert's views, just as Fichte's first period required the second for its completion.

Professor Rickert concludes his work with some remarks on a historical Weltanschauung, in contrast to a naturalistic one, and he gives illustrations of the applications of his general theory to the theory of ethics and of the state. The entire book is to me a convincing proof that our epistemological investigations, when carried out to the bitter end, land us in metaphysics. Knowledge cannot live on vague postulates alone. Apart from the insufficiency of the conclusion, Professor Rickert's book is a thoroughly valuable piece of work; indeed, the best recent discussion of the logic of history that I know. It seems to me that he establishes his main contention in regard to the relations of natural science and history. He develops his theory of historical knowledge with painstaking acumen and a many-sided outlook. He is particularly skillful in careful definition and minute analysis. The style is clear and interesting, though there is some unnecessary repetition.

It is somewhat startling to find a theory of emotion the central theme in a psychological introduction to ethics. At first glance, one is inclined to suspect that the author had a theory of emotion ready to hand, and that he wished to write an introduction to ethics, and consequently exercised his ingenuity in inventing a plausible argument to unite the ill-matched pair. A closer examination, however, dispels the suspicion, and leaves the reader wondering whether the author deserves more praise for the ability and skill shown in the elaboration of his argument, or for the insight that led him to attack his problem from such an excellent coign of vantage.

The ethical theory to which Dr. Irons's investigations lead does not differ widely from that set forth by Professor James Seth in his Ethical Principles and called by him Eudæmonism. Though the name suggests a variety of Hedonism, the theory asserts that "the moral end is not the attainment of pleasure," and that "hedonic results as such are therefore extrinsic to it" (p. 170). At the same time, "the supreme end does not require the absolute suppression of the hedonic tendencies" (p. 169).