Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/160

144 all, I should then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is; and thus truth would be injured." He who would not violate truth must avoid all injustice. From Wollaston's standpoint, then, the murder of a fellow-being is merely an action which denies an evident truth, namely, that the victim is a fellow-being. In other words, murder is nothing more than a lie; it is essentially a form of untruthfulness, and this is why it is wrong. It is a very emphatic lie, to be sure, and Wollaston would doubtless assert that it is on that account emphatically wrong. The real nature and the ultimate significance of vicious action, as Wollaston understands them, are described in the following terms. "Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest possible absurdity. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to deny the existence of anything." In these circumstances it is somewhat comforting to learn that "it is not in one's power deliberately to resolve not to be governed by reason." For if any person "could do this, he must either have some reason for making that resolution or none. If he has none, it is a resolution that stands upon no foundation, and, therefore, in course falls; and if he has some reason for it, he is governed by reason. This demonstrates that reason must govern."

The standpoint of Clarke and Wollaston is the first form of modern rationalism. The further development of the rationalistic point of view is influenced by the doctrine, originated by Shaftesbury and elaborated by Hutcheson, that moral distinctions must be referred, not to reason, but to an internal sense. Directly and indirectly, the moral sense theory brought to light the essential weakness of the position adopted by Clarke and Wollaston. It thus forced upon the later rationalists the task of modifying, or at least restating, this view of morality. We must, therefore, consider with some care the main contentions of the moral sense school. Hutcheson's primary aim is to show that moral approval is an ultimate fact. We do not regard actions and dispositions merely as