Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/154



HE rationalistic point of view, as it appears in modern ethics, assumes so many different forms that its essential features are not at first sight apparent. The conclusions to which it leads are so strained and unnatural, that it is difficult to understand why it is ever adopted and defended as an adequate explanation of morality. A brief account of the rise and development of modern rationalism will throw some light on these points, and prepare the way for a critical evaluation of the fundamental principles which all rationalistic theories presuppose.

Rationalism makes its first appearance in modern ethics as the opponent of the doctrine of Hobbes. Whatever interpretation be put upon Hobbes's theory, one conclusion is clear, namely, that moral rules are not unconditionally valid. Each individual seeks his own safety, gain, or glory, and is thus brought into direct conflict with his fellows. The natural state of mankind is a state of war. But human beings are also rational, and perceive that it is advantageous from a selfish point of view to restrain their selfish inclinations so that peace may be possible. Moral laws are "the articles of peace" suggested by reason. They are founded, therefore, on the nature of things, are laws of nature; for peace is intrinsically better than war, and these rules are the indispensable conditions of peace. It does not follow, however, that these laws are to be obeyed in all circumstances, "for he that should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he promises in such time and place, where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which tend to nature's preservation." In other words, it is not reasonable from the selfish standpoint, that one individual should act in accordance with the principles of peace when others are at war with him. Consequently, moral laws are valid only if all obey