Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/116

100 According to Mr. Lane, the law of social motion entails human equality through the operation of natural selection. In fact, the two principles are very much the same. It also entails the equality of the sexes, which is being brought about by the increasing weight of woman's brain among civilized peoples. It further entails a rapid trend to a mean of population, which, when once attained, "can never again be disturbed." It is also to be noted that the force of progress is eliminating inferior races, not by war and pestilence, but by diffusion of wealth and education. If the author's theory is correct, it goes far toward accomplishing his purpose to harmonize the bewildering facts of human history, to account for the contradictions between human aspirations and human injustice, and to foreshadow the future of human society. But Mr. Lane's theory will encounter some scepticism among those who believe that recent investigations show 'natural selection' to have been greatly overworked, and that its area of operation is limited, especially in the social realm. Analogous doubt will arise in reference to the claim that the human brain is increasing in weight. Even suppose that there is such an increase in weight, it by no means follows that this means an increase in intelligence or in social effectiveness, unless it can be shown, which it admittedly cannot, that there is a correlation of brain weight and mental power. Still, quite apart from such considerations, Mr. Lane's book is a good one and can be heartily commended to serious students of social science.

This book consists of two parts, the first being a brief exposition of Herbert Spencer's Data of Ethics, the second a discussion and criticism of it. The criticism proceeds largely upon the traditional lines of opposition to the theory of evolution, and represents the view of Roman Catholic theology. As against the theory of development as applied to man, the author declares for special creation. He has failed to grasp certain elements of Spencer's system, or has failed to keep them steadily in mind in his criticism. It is quite beside the mark to attack Spencer's view of morality as being merely external. To do so is to ignore his insistence upon the fact that every genuinely moral experience is essentially internal, with sanctions that are clearly distinguishable from those of the prudential morality which has been its nurse. Spencer's system as a whole surely presents sufficient points of attack without increasing them by misinterpretation. In another matter the writer seems to vacillate in his criticism. At one time he finds Spencer's teaching fatal to positive morality by reason of what he regards as its selfish and hedonistic tendencies; at another he arraigns it as requiring an altruism too strenuous and lofty for mortals. The rationale of the system which M. Halleux would himself offer is not altogether clear from the discussion. Appeal is made to the will of