Page:Philosophical Review Volume 12.djvu/111

No. 1.] Kantian and post-Kantian ethics on the same ground that he opposes Christianity, viz., on the ground of ultimate social reference. For philosophy the problem of moralism versus immoralism transforms itself into the problem of egoism versus altruism. Guyau believes that altruism will finally triumph over egoism. Schopenhauer and Ribot are quoted to confirm the writer's view that there are two or more ultimate tendencies in human nature.

The idea of finality is an empty form. The only scientific side of finality is its mechanical aspect. We go back to the early stages of the race to see the psychical mechanism from which the idea of social teleology arose. The first law of primitive people is the law of mental inertia, with the corollary of least work. This law is instinctive and the dispositions which it inspires are adapted to the immediate difficulties. At first man's prevision is very limited and he looks only to the needs of the present, but with more experience his view is broadened, and he recognizes a utility beyond the here and the now. The first law thus transforms itself into the law of maximum of effect. At this stage, there is an awakening of energetic disposition and willed action takes the place of instinctive action. It is teleological, in the sense that it implies the representation of the ends to be obtained. Division of labor now appears. Wealth is accumulated for the future, and at length riches are sought as an end. Personality tends to be lost in industry, literature, art, and morality; uniformity prevails. The excessive development of the law of the maximum of advantageous effects produces social disorganization and economic crises. It is the duty of the individual to break away from this industrial uniformity and return to æsthetic diversity. If this return is not made, industry, art, and culture are doomed. A third law appears in the modern world, the law of the organization of human activities to promote harmonious and intense individual life. At the end of the article, the writer concludes that there is no absolute end, no absolute social well-being, and no absolutely fixed direction of development.

The purpose of the present discussion—called forth by an article recently published in this Revue by M. Brochard—is to indicate briefly the influence of Plotinus upon the doctrine of Leibniz, and to show that the close affiliation of the systems of these two writers can only be the result of common metaphysical principles. That the neo-Platonist should be rarely mentioned among the inspirers of Leibniz is especially strange in view of the striking similarity of terms and metaphors found in the Enneads and