Page:Philosophical Review Volume 11.djvu/618

602 of the actor. We say that a deed can be no better, nor any worse, than the person who does it. There is, however, another tendency which contradicts that view. We feel that there is a certain degree of justice in saying that good intention is not enough, and that success is after all the fair test of merit. We blame the man who constantly falls short of his resolutions and calculations, even when it appears out of his power, for the single moment at least, to help himself. We say that it was his business to calculate correctly, that he 'ought to have known better' and that a 'blunderer is worse than a deliberate rascal.' We judge him in this case, not by his intention, but for having this intention, that is, we submit the intention itself to some further criterion, namely, the actual outcome of the act, and we judge his judgment according to the way it tallies with the actual situation.

Spencer has unquestionably got hold of part of the truth, when, in his chapter on "Good and Bad Conduct," he puts the criterion in the result, and says that the good act is the one that is good for something, that is effective. We must accept this to a certain extent, or have no content whatever for the concept 'good.' Here we come to the paradoxical conclusion that in the particular instance we must judge a man by his intention, but in the long run we must have reference to some actually effected result. Expressed in another way, we may say that it is possible for the moment for a man to be good though his habits are bad, or for his habits to be good and the man bad.

The question, then, is: How can we judge a man by his intention, and still have any real content for the moral judgment? The contradiction may be reconciled on an evolutionary and organic theory. Such a theory would say that evolution consists in a continual increase in the points of adjustment between intention and results, and that development is measured by the capacity for accurate foresight. If this were the whole truth, then the criterion might justly lie in the outcome of the act; but the theory goes on to say, that evolution consists further in an increase in the number and complexity of intentions. This is what keeps the road open, so that, in proportion as we are putting