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HERE is probably no name which is so intimately associated with the idea of an evolutionary ethics as the name of Herbert Spencer. It seems fair to say that Spencer has done more than any other modern writer to popularize the conception of evolution as a type of explanation in philosophical disciplines. The language and the whole tenor of The Principles of Ethics is so permeated with the evolutionary idea, that Spencer seems, at first sight, to be the representative par excellence of the evolutionary type of theory; and yet, upon reflection, one may well ask whether even Spencer is a thorough-going evolutionist in his theory of morals—whether he logically and consistently holds to the principle of evolution in his ethical doctrine. The point which the present criticism has to make is just this: that Spencer's theory is not consistent throughout with the principle of evolution. Conduct, according to his theory, is directed towards a fixed end. He describes activities as developing, but he points to an ethical goal which is absolute; thus he gets an evolutionary process with a non-evolutionary result. His principle is used to explain only half of the situation; it applies to acts, but not to ends. His ethics is, therefore, only half-way evolutionary. This conclusion is derived from an attempt to answer the following questions: I. What do we mean by evolution? What, by evolutionary ethics? 2. How does Spencer's theory answer the demands which any truly evolutionary theory must meet?

Spencer's conception of evolution is stated in this formula in his First Principles. "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." The following from Windelband