Page:Philosophical Review Volume 11.djvu/115

99 only upon the basis of a complex series of psychical processes, of which the elements, sensation, feeling, and will, form the first member. An actual experience, however, cannot be reduced by analysis to these elements alone, for even the simplest mental process involves comparison, which for this reason is called the most fundamental of the psychological riddles. Closely connected with it is the consciousness of succession, which is the comparison of experiences differing in time. This successive comparison is held to be always direct, and independent of simultaneous comparison Without it any comparison of the duration of conscious states or a consciousness of succession would be impossible. It is a projection into the past, just as expectation is a projection into the future. The latter is explained as an associative tendency, and without it the idea of objective reality is declared to be impossible. The recognition of the expected experience, the union of it with expectation, is the type of the countless processes in which we suppose we have an idea of what is not and cannot be thought; for the future is, from the psychological standpoint, merely a symbol, with no claim to be called an actual experience. These subjective projections, as they may be called, form the foundation of the different symbolizations present in external reality, where the distinction between existence and experience is brought to complete development.

Following the discussion of actuality, is that of the conscious life of others; and, in conclusion, the problems of the thing-in-itself and of minds or separate egos receive due treatment. Every projection is described as the result of the tendency to render experience more stable by finding for it some sufficient cause. One of the most interesting portions of the book is that in which are considered the relative merits of parallelism and interaction, where, in accordance with the author's general position, interaction is found to be the only logical possibility. The entire treatise, which is always suggestive if sometimes unconvincing, constantly presupposes the Kantian standpoint, even though it radically differs from Kant's express theories.

This monograph on the underlying motives of Lotze's philosophical speculation was presented by the writer to the faculty of Cornell University as a thesis in application for the doctor's degree. As such it furnishes one more proof of the thoroughness of the work that is being accomplished by our 'schools' or 'faculties' of philosophy, and of the largeness of the attainments which they are requiring from their candidates for advanced degrees. Miss Moore's treatise gains still more in interest from the character of the subject considered and the point of view adopted. The trend of her discussion of Lotze's thinking is indicated at the outset of the inquiry:—