Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/96

80 then, is the law of sub-human Justice: that each individual shall receive the benefits and the evils of its own nature and its consequent conduct" (p. 9). This formula, however, is adequate only for creatures which lead solitary lives. When we pass to gregarious creatures, we find a second factor in sub-human Justice. Association and co-operation are impossible without some limits to individual activity. To the positive and primary element of Justice — the receipt of benefits and injuries due to the nature of the individual — must, therefore, be added a negative and secondary element — non-interference with the like actions of associated individuals. There is even a further qualification of the primal law. So far from receiving the benefits and evils of its own nature, a member of a species may occasionally be sacrificed for the prosperity and preservation of the entire species.

Human Justice has no other elements than those constituting sub-human justice. The law of the survival of the fittest holds of man as of all inferior creatures. The individuals best adapted to the environment prosper most; the individuals least adapted prosper least. "And as before, so here, we see that, ethically considered, this law implies that each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils of his own nature and consequent conduct" (p. 17). As Justice becomes more pronounced with the advance of organization, it is higher in man than in brutes, and higher in civilized than in savage mankind. This is especially noticeable in regard to its negative element. Throughout the animal kingdom Justice is realized mainly, if not exclusively, in the results of an unchecked struggle for life; but under the conditions imposed by the social life of man, individual activities must be limited, if they are not all to be annihilated, by the similar activities of other individuals. "Thus the mutual restrictions, which simultaneous carrying on of their actions necessitates, form a necessary element of Justice in the associated state" (p. 151).

This objective Justice, if I may call it so, does not fail of its subjective counterpart. Mind, like body, tends ever towards adjustment to the conditions of existence. Feelings appropriate to that habitual connection between conduct and consequence wherein Justice consists, gradually emerge, nascently in lower animals, distinctly in man. Such is the origin of the sentiment of Justice. In its earliest form it is a feeling which prompts the maintenance of freedom of action. This is the egoistic sentiment of Justice. The development of the altruistic sentiment of Justice — the subjective response to the requirement that each shall act within the limits imposed by the actions of others — is brought about in the course of adaptation to social life. The primitive tendency to pursue the objects of desire without regard to the interests of fellow-men is gradually checked under the influence of four deterrents: the