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These volumes are made up of a number of essays, mostly on literary subjects, which have already appeared in the monthly magazines, of the two articles contributed to the Encyclopædia Britannica on Cartesianism and Metaphysic, and of a lecture now published for the first time on Carlyle. The first volume is devoted to literature; it treats of Dante, Goethe, Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Carlyle, besides containing a lecture on the Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time. The second volume contains the two Britannica articles.

The work throughout is essentially philosophical. In the first volume Professor Caird everywhere endeavors to bring out the spiritual aspect of poetry, to discover the fundamental ideas which the poets embodied in their creations. These ideas are the ultimate notions of the philosopher. Hence, as Professor Caird says, "Philosophy is, in the end, at one with poetry" (p. 63). Their method and point of departure are different, but they have the same goal. A consideration of the world's great poets from this point of view is not too common: it demands, besides philosophical knowledge, literary feeling and insight. It is not too much to say that Professor Caird has accomplished the task with admirable success. The essays on Rousseau and Wordsworth are especially noteworthy.

The articles on Cartesianism and Metaphysic have been before the public several years. They are characterized by breadth of mind and grace and lucidity of style. The former, which was first published in 1876, suffers from neglect of later literature upon the same subject. This is especially true of the account of Spinoza, whom Professor Caird treats as a mere continuation of the Cartesian philosophy, the logical outcome of its fundamental principles. Hence he fails to do justice to Spinoza's doctrine, both of substance and attribute. Spinoza's absolute being, we are told, is "being without determination, and not the being that determines itself" (pp. 366, 367). Now Spinoza does, indeed, take pains to free his substance from all external limitations, but only that it may the more completely determine itself. Professor Caird adopts Erdmann's view of the attributes as relative to percipient intelligence. But this is not to be reconciled with Spinoza's own definition: Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens. It is only when finite things are regarded as res complete, as outside and over against the one substance, that they are illusions of the imagination. Finite things are, indeed, manifestations.