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HE direction in which the Psychology of our day has made its most striking advances is that of the development of psycho-physics. A very large proportion of the complex and absorbing investigations which are undertaken by those who devote themselves to this relatively new science deal with phenomena of Sensation, and therefore we should not be unprepared to find, as we clearly do find, those who become absorbed in this and kindred studies emphasizing the function of Sensation and to some extent exaggerating its importance in the mental field. This tendency is often manifest in the writings of scientific men who are not psychologists, but who deal directly or indirectly with neural anatomy and pathology, in which writings it is common to find casual statements which imply a classification of Pain with Sensation, although one finds no similar classification of Pleasure.

Incidental statements like those just referred to are difficult to treat seriously, and psychologists owe acknowledgment to Dr. Herbert Nichols for having brought into the field of argument, in clear form, the theory that Pleasure and Pain are Sensations, as he has done in the articles published in the July and September numbers of this. I wish here to make a statement as concise as possible of the arguments for and against this view and to show the grounds upon which I base my conclusion that the position is untenable.

Let us first examine the arguments presented in favor of the hypothesis that Pleasures and Pains are to be classified with Sensations.

1. It is held that Pain is just as distinct, just as 'disparate,' as any of those mental states which we all agree to call Rh