Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/598

582 life succumb under the influence of persuasion or education. A new demarcation between good and evil results; indeed, this is the name given to the victory of one plan over its competitors. The success of a moral ideal, however, is not the cause, but only the proof of its goodness. Society as a whole may be compared to a genus of which the individual members are specimens. Because each one's plan of life is social, it appeals in some degree to the rest. The gradual transition from the struggle between individuals to the struggle between plans, is clearly traceable in the history of toleration. In more modern times it appears in conflicts over the theory of punishment. In reality, natural selection is on the side of those who pity rather than hate crime. Punishment is a weapon in the conflict of plans, a means of persuasion rather than of extermination. So, too, the ideas of the French Revolution were spread by armies; at present democratic ideas are spread by persuasion. Natural selection offers no reason why every member of society should not be preserved and helped to live as effectively as he can. At the present time it is at work not so much in the fierce competition of business as in the struggle between the two rival systems of competition and collectivism.

Approbation or disapprobation is directed towards things as fit or unfit to accomplish desired ends. The altruist approves the labors of those who work to make life richer, and disapproves the opposite. Strong desire turns approbation into demand, while increased knowledge leads one to limit his demands by another's possibilities of compliance. This pressure of one will on another, demanding of it a certain course of action, is a strong social influence. If insufficient, it can be strengthened only by reward or punishment. These facts serve to explain moral obligation.

The ought involves an affirmation that a certain action is necessary as a means to a certain end and an emotion accompanying that affirmation. There are four distinguishable forms, — the 'I ought,' the 'you ought,' and the more impersonal forms culminating in the theological ought. The ought assumes the existence in another of the desire for an action, while the must makes no such assumption. When from the idea of obligation the element of the good or the ideal is eliminated, nothing remains but mere submission to an arbitrary imperative. Hence obligation cannot be the fundamental fact of moral experience.