Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/589

Rh fundamental similarities in human nature, some impulses being common to all mankind, and observe, under like conditions, a regularity of action. And this is all that is meant by embracing phenomena under general terms, and referring to the uniformity of nature. When the writer denies the reign of law in the universe, and in the same breath speaks of the inexorable law of personality, it is difficult to know whether to take him seriously or not.

His objections against the utilitarian theory seem to me to rest on a misunderstanding of its doctrines. We might easily forgive him for identifying welfare with mere passive enjoyment, but surely his contention that some nations have not consciously aimed at welfare cannot be urged as an argument against the principle. The absolute authority of the law which he instances as another serious difficulty would also militate against his own system. Besides, he himself afterwards gives a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon when he characterizes conscience as a "remnant of education." Again, the assertion that moral nations have been destroyed does not warrant the conclusion that morality is not a preservative. No society could exist without moral rules, yet the mere observance of these prescriptions cannot be an absolute guarantee of survival. I cannot live without eating, but eating will not keep me alive forever. Gallwitz also points out that peoples have perished because of their customs, and infers from this that customs do not conduce to the common weal. No one maintains that all customs lead to general welfare; there are good, bad, and indifferent courses of conduct, those which injure the race being bad.

The development of individual personality is accepted by the author as the ethical end. The vagueness generally belonging to the term is obviated by the introduction of theological conceptions. Wherever the theory fails, the deus ex machina steps in. The writer is, however, bolder and more logical than self-realization moralists usually are in drawing the necessary conclusion of the theory. Where there are collisions between personal and social ends, the latter must yield. Yet this consistency divulges the weakness of the principle, and invites attack. Call such a system egoistic hedonism or egoistic perfectionism, it is none the less selfish.

But these objections must not blind us to the real excellences of the book. It deserves commendation for the way in which it approaches the problem as well as for its general appreciation of the facts both psychological and historical, and cannot fail to be of service to those interested in the subject of ethics.

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