Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/569

Rh stimulus to work over and appropriate the minimum of material thus given." Proceeding on this principle, the author gives but eight or ten lines of definition under each heading, and this is followed by several pages of discussion; in this discussion opposite theories are criticised, sometimes the history of thought on the topic is briefly given, and there is always great abundance of illustrative example. Although the book is intended for beginners, more attention to historical development would certainly be expected in these discussions. Otherwise the book might prove admirable in the hands of its author; but it is at least doubtful whether another could follow such an elaborate outline, without losing all life and individuality in his teaching. Another defect of this method is that the author often fails to indicate with sufficient clearness the results of his discussion. For example, the section entitled "What is a judgment?" would hardly enable the beginner to obtain a clear conception of the author's view.

In the present state of logical science the writer of a text-book has no easy task before him, but for once the savor of the middle ages remains only in a few forms. Logic is defined as "the study (Lehre) of correct thinking." It is at first identified with the psychology of the intellect, and then distinguished from this by its practical purpose. It would seem as if the word correct in the definition should be enough to indicate the relation of the two branches.

In the first division, "Logical Ideas" (Vorstellungen), the concept is defined as an idea with one definite meaning. This is the first element of thought, and therefore the beginning of logic is the study of the concept as true. The two most important kinds of concepts are the representable or concrete, and the abstract which cannot be represented in imagination. In accordance with the method pursued, definition and division are treated at great length and with abundant examples.

The second division, "Logical Judgments, or the theory of evidence," is written from the standpoint of Breñtano. Judgment cannot be defined any more than can idea; it is a simple psychical process. This process uses ideas, and expresses a belief or disbelief in the truth of the idea (or ideas) affirmed. At the same time judgments are classified in the old way as affirmative and negative, universal and particular, categorical and hypothetical; and in this classification the view of the judgment first presented seems to be almost forgotten. The sections on the syllogism present the received doctrine with but little variation. After a rather artificial classification of inferences from a single premise, the discussion and proof of the rules of the syllogism seem especially fresh and vigorous. Instead of the brief discussion of fallacies, commonly given in text-books, the methods of proof are carefully examined, and on this basis errors in proof may be more scientifically treated.