Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/55

Rh the fact of self-consciousness, the "stream of thought" has been described. We are now told how a certain "fluctuating material" is built up into a variety of empirical selves which stand more or less remote from that ego, which psychology generally recognizes as somehow, in the evolution of experience, set over against a non-ego —that which is I and is not even my body. But, according to the author, the essential core of every known self is the distinct feeling of some bodily process. And the "Self of selves, when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat"; — this, at least, is what Professor James finds true in his own case (I, p. 301 f.). And, in more general terms, with some persons at least, the "part of the innermost Self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist for the most part of a collection of cephalic movements of 'adjustments' which, for want of attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are." It is admitted here, however, "that over and above these there is an obscurer feeling of something more"; and this may be of "fainter physiological processes," or it may be of "nothing objective at all" (P. 305).

With such remarks as those just quoted, the real problem of self-consciousness is dismissed for some pages; it is resumed later as a discussion of the three theories (spiritualist, associationist, transcendentalist) concerning the "pure self or inner principle of personal identity." Each of these three theories is taken up, criticised, and rejected. The theory of a soul to which, as subject, the thoughts and feelings belong, is held to be "needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear" (p. 344). But — by the way, I remark — the theory of a brain does not appear to be needless. Says Professor James: the "bald fact is that when the brain acts, a thought occurs." Not at all: we must either say — and adhere to it — the truth demanded by all the science is that, when the brain acts, the mind acts; or else we must say: when such and such a known cerebral phenomenon occurs then such and such a corresponding thought or feeling occurs.