Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/490

474 is neither the necessary nor sufficient condition of moral responsibility. A man may utter an insulting remark without wishing to arouse another's wrath; but if the word expresses the person's sentiments, there is, between the personality and the act, an agreement which creates responsibility. Only in so far as intention implies a co-ordination of physical elements, a direction of different elements towards a common end, can it be said to contribute to responsibility. Of effort the same may be said. This, which like all psychical phenomena has its psychological conditions, shows the individual's ability to resist tendencies not in accord with his ego as a whole. It proves how well organized the personality is. If the effort be suppressed, and the organization remains the same, responsibility, merit, and demerit are not diminished. The better organized the personality is, the less effort is needed. Thus far we have considered the ego as an organized whole. It is, however, not so complete a system; the various psychical elements are not always closely united with each other. What makes up responsibility in this case? The reply is: Every psychical element is responsible for its logical consequences, for other psychical phenomena produced by it according to the law of systematic association. "The responsibility of psychical elements is in inverse ratio to the responsibility of the whole ego, it is inversely proportional to the solidarity of each of the elements with the sum of the others." Responsibility in morbid and abnormal states is also measured by the co-ordination of the phenomena. Where the personality is completely dissolved, the acts resulting from it have no moral significance. There is no coherence between the madman's ideas, nor between his ideas and his acts. But if certain parts of his mental organization remain co-ordinated, he is to be held responsible for the deeds attributed to these. Similarly, in cases of hypnotism, double personality, etc., each separate personality may be made responsible. The affected person is responsible for whatever necessarily follows from the intact psychical organization. P. next considers the individual in his relation to society. It is an indisputable fact that a large part of a man's personality is the product of social influences. If the perversity of the individual represents the logical results of the regular functioning of a social system, then the latter is more or less responsible. Thus an organization whose system of correction tends to vitiate those who undergo it must be responsible for the effects of such punishments. Still, it is not the only responsible party; the individual too comes in for his share. Just as society has been the object of physical, social, and individual influences, and yet is responsible for what it has done, so also the individual, though not responsible for the vicious social system which perverts him, remains when once perverted responsible for this alteration. Suppose a person changes his nature, let the cause be what