Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/49

Rh of brain-processes occasionally interjected into the discussion of psychological phenomena.

Let me, then, at once speak frankly and clearly. The conception of psychology as a natural science with which Professor James sets out, is — in my judgment — a wholly untenable conception. To adopt it is to confess the impossibility of giving any truly scientific character to psychology. The author does not himself adhere to it. Moreover, he does precisely what all who adopt the same conception find themselves compelled to do; he becomes metaphysical. He postulates some of those abhorred "deeper-lying entities"; and then he puts them through a course of conjectural processes in order to explain other (conscious) processes which are not conjectural, but are indubitably known to exist.

It is, indeed, conceivable that, at some time in the future, a small branch, or twig, of scientific psychology to be called the "cerebral," may be established. It will always be peculiarly difficult, however, to keep that set of explanatory conditions, which lies in the cerebral hemispheres, free from metaphysical postulates. The way to the establishment of any science of cerebral psychology is long and thorny and dangerous. It is as yet scarcely open to even the boldest flight of imagination; there will be, in the best estate of cerebral psychology in the future, few who will actually tread, with assurance and safety, terra firma in this path.

What then would be necessary to establish psychology as a natural science after the pattern of Professor James' conception of it? A comprehensive scientific grasp on two related orders of phenomena? They are the "thoughts and feelings," that are the phenomena with which, primarily, psychology deals; and, also, the "brain-processes," —- and these, with that exactness, certainty, and detail of information, which makes the knowledge of phenomena worthy to be called science. The "thoughts and feelings" we do both know and know about, in a truly scientific way. We can describe them, as Professor James frequently does in such brilliant and interesting fashion. Moreover, we can explain them, by reference to their elements and