Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/489

No. 4.] this, that the man is guided by his own insight as to what constitutes a valid ground for the censures of his fellow-men. What mankind will feel happy in doing cannot be stated in any general, objectively valid way; but we may show with sufficient accuracy what rules of conduct men would be glad to see others follow towards them. The conscience is always a state of feeling connected with the idea of what others should reasonably be pleased to see us do towards them. III. The Growth of the Conscience. — Life in society is the absolutely indispensable condition of the distinction between praiseworthy and blamable acts. Every one who is the object of respect and reverence may feel a general security and confidence that he will meet with no hinderance from his fellows, but he may follow his impulses and work for the accomplishment of his desires. When the desire to live in peace and to sleep in security takes possession of the mind, the conscience arises and becomes the judge of all our particular inclinations. What we shall then ask of our emotions is whether they entitle us to the respect or contempt of other men. The case is the same with the religious feelings. What God sees reason to command or forbid we feel bound by the conscience to do or to forbear. Man's relations to God are simply a new kind of society. Religion has aided the growth of the conscience, especially with regard to its capital point, viz., independence of the real relations between the individual and his neighbors. It has done this by constituting a society by the side of, or rather above, the real human society. A mind indifferent to the respect and contempt of others and a mind caring only for what the feelings of others actually are are alike devoid of conscience. The pleasure of felt harmony with the society about us consists mainly in the tendency it has to increase the volume and freedom of all our mental activities. But if we win respect without reason we can put but small reliance on its permanence. The moral code is the whole sum of our experience, accumulated and sifted through the ages, of what constitutes a good reason why our fellow-men should be satisfied or dissatisfied with us.

Responsibility is not a question of causality, of free will or determination, but of finality. It rests on the solidarity of the diverse tendencies forming the individual. A person is responsible for his acts in so far as he is their cause. But this is not enough. There must be harmony between the different tendencies of the ego, between this particular tendency and this particular act, between the act and its consequences. The greater this systematization, the greater the responsibility.