Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/461

Rh mind. Professor Fullerton apparently takes a different view. The function of a translator, he seems to think, is to render his author faithfully, i.e. word for word. And so closely does he adhere to this ideal, that he even (p. 25) translates hercle by its literal equivalent " by Hercules." Introduced in a modern book, and in the middle of a grave discussion about the nature of God, the unexpected apparition of this pagan demigod has rather a comic effect. Most translators would be content with "forsooth," or a mere mark of exclamation, or a slight emphasis in the form of sentence; but Professor Fullerton has a sterner conception of duty than that. Here is a specimen of the way in which he renders the simpler parts of the Ethics: "Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been from eternity actual, and to all eternity will remain in the same actuality. And thus there is established a — at least in my opinion — far more perfect omnipotence of God. Indeed, my opponents appear to deny (allow me to speak plainly) the omnipotence of God. For they are forced to admit that God apprehends as creatable an infinity of things which, nevertheless, he will never be able to create" (p. 40). The art of translating badly could hardly further go than this. Not only is the phrase "far more perfect omnipotence" nonsense, — the translator's nonsense; for Spinoza says nothing of the kind, — but "a — at least in my opinion — far more perfect omnipotence of God" is as pretty a "derangement of epitaphs" as I remember ever to have seen, and "apprehending as creatable an infinity of things" does not overwhelm one by its elegance. The meaning of Spinoza would perhaps have been better understood had the passage been turned somewhat thus: "The omnipotence of God has therefore been in activity from all eternity, and to all eternity will continue in activity. Thus, as I venture to think, God's omnipotence is placed upon a very much firmer basis than upon the view of our opponents; nay, to be quite frank, their doctrine seems to me to lead to a complete denial of God's omnipotence; for it forces them to admit that God has no power to create an infinite number of things of which he has a perfectly clear idea."

In his translation of more technical passages Mr. Fullerton is sometimes inaccurate, and almost always inadequate. For instance, definition 6 of Part I he translates thus (p. 19): "By God I mean a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes," etc. Now the phrase "infinite attributes" may mean either (a) attributes having the quality of infinity, or (b) attributes which are infinite in number. The latter is what Spinoza means, as is evident from proposition 9. Hence we should read: "By God I understand an absolutely infinite being, i.e. a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes." Again, the "explanation" of definition 8 is thus rendered: "For such