Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/437

No. 4.] of little value to the bulk of our aesthetic life. Most of the aesthetics of vision we shall, in proper place, endeavor to account for as associations. Whether we now have pure aesthetic sensations of color will depend, as we hold, on whether there are yet fibres in the retina which will respond directly to ordinary light of any kind with sensations of pain or pleasure. Whether there be any such or not is a matter for investigation. If they be found, certain aesthetic phenomena would be quite in accord with their presence; yet so indistinguishable are our different forms of pleasure to present introspection that no obvious difficulty is presented to accounting for these same phenomena as associations. The kinds of stimulation likely to cause these phenomena may be described as the "pure and massive," — such as would subject a large portion of the retina or of the visual area of the cortex to deep, steady, and prolonged, but not painfully violent stimulation. Such might be a mild flood of light of pure and unmixed color. A landscape or mountain view of deep perspective might do the same. They would be pleasures from sight in general and probably without color preferences. They would suggest summative processes and speak of primitive conditions now somewhat atrophied. Our reasons for suspecting these will appear later.

We now pass to the aesthetics of figure and of perspective. The retina, unlike any other of the so-called sense organs, is a part of the cortex. The cortex is pre-eminently a centre of memories, conscious and unconscious. Rising from the classical discussions of the space problem are reasons to believe that our perceptions of space, figure, and perspective are peculiarly dependent upon developed memories. If it should happen that certain parts of the retina acting as cortex areas were the physical basis of certain memories fundamental to the workings of our eyes as space organs, we ought not to class these memories as sensations. And if mixed among these memories, which though unconscious in the retina should work to rouse corresponding conscious memories in the upper cortex, — if among the latter were memories of pleasure or pain quality, as well as of color or of muscle-sense quality, plainly such aesthetic results should