Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/408

392 Yet the fact of some sort of recurrence, of an assumed identity, remains. How shall we explain the assumption, the fact that we call the new phenomenon of consciousness "the same" as one which has preceded it? The only answer is this: the identity or recurrence belong to the form, as distinguished from the matter, of consciousness, to the permanent relations, as distinguished from the changing stuff, to the universal as distinguished from the particular. In other words, one can never have the same sensations in the present as in the past, but one may be conscious "in the same way," at different times.

A final presupposition of the fact of association is that of the identity of the subject. The same "I" must exist if there is to be consciousness "in the same way" or "of the same object." A discussion of the nature of this I would, of course, be an unwarranted intrusion of metaphysics into psychology, but the existence of a consciousness, in some sense continuous, is presupposed by the fact of those permanent relations of consciousness which, in turn, are necessary to explain the assumed identity, the recurrence, of objects of consciousness.

This entire introductory discussion may be summarized briefly, after the following fashion: —

A. Characteristics of states of consciousness (in so far as they are single, psychic events): — Succession / Change  (without recurrence or persistence).

B. Characteristics of objects of consciousness: — (. — The object of consciousness must ultimately be analyzed into (1) Sensations (2) Permanent relations of consciousness. Both persistence and recurrence are true only of the latter.)

Either I. Succession. a. The succeeding objects of consciousness are 1. Objects of perception (always more or less "recurrent"). 2. Objects of memory, imagination, etc. (obviously "recurrent").