Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/407

No. 4.] exist with a persistence of certain relations of consciousness, but association is not persistence. Association, finally, is not a sort of psychic force or agent; it is simply the fact of a connection which always exists between succeeding, recurrent objects of consciousness (when the second is not an object of perception).

This fact of recurrence, the obvious presupposition of association, is that which has been falsely treated as association by similarity. It is the fact involved in the assertion, "This object — this feeling — this effort — is the same as that earlier one." Association never exists unless the associated objects of consciousness are, in whole or in part, "the same" as preceding ones, which may, in this sense, be said to recur. It is therefore necessary to examine more closely this supposed recurrence, this assumed identity of a later with an earlier object of consciousness. In what sense is it true; to what extent is a present experience identical with a past experience?

The answer to this question requires the delayed analysis of the object of consciousness. An object as known includes, at first sight, the sensations which are peculiar to it. But the identity, which we are seeking to explain, can be no identity of the particular sensations of the present with those of the past. For these sensations have no permanence, they are of the moment, they have no vitality which should bring them to life again. My present cognition of an object is a materially different fact from my yesterday's cognition.