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No. 3.] . He can arouse the activity of ideation, and meet his impulses with opposing motives. Here Hartmann deserts his principles and pursues a phantom of freedom. His presupposition is that morality has reached an advanced state of development before such resistance on the part of the doer is possible. Herein lies an unconscious acknowledgment of the fact that these moral powers necessarily influence the will. The fact that one man applies anti-impulsive motives, the other not, is due to the former's possessing more moral insight and will-power than the latter; and this condition depends on innumerable causes. The final product of all these causes is, therefore, absolutely determined, and cannot be considered free and responsible. In many passages of his Philosophy of the Unconscious, Hartmann's language is that of the determinist, in the face of which his attempt to find a basis for blame must be futile. It is a contradiction in his philosophy to hold, on the one hand, the uniform development of all physical and moral powers, on the other, to deny that they act according to uniform law. Because a man, who has been systematically trained, is able to resist temptations, he is not, on that account, free and responsible. K. would hold him responsible because certain causes must, if the conditions are favorable, necessarily produce insight and morality.

The present article treats only of the relations between hypnotism and criminality. This is a serious question, as some hypnotic subjects are quite capable of committing the gravest crimes under the influence of suggestion. It is to be remembered, however, that irresistible criminal suggestion is possible only in a very few cases — about four per cent of those experimented upon. But in a city like Paris even this means 100,000 persons. The state of the hypnotic subject is often very singular, not at all like sleep. He appears to be in a perfectly normal condition, except as to the one point on which the command or the prohibition of the experimenter rests. Observation of an hypnotic subject to whom a criminal act has been suggested is instructive. At first there may be hesitation, perplexity, etc., but at length the idea suggested holds the field alone, and the suggested act is performed fatally, without regret or remorse, for as soon as accomplished it is forgotten. Cases of "double personality" are well authenticated. Here the patient, when in the "condition seconde" commonly remembers both ordinary experiences and what has happened during previous attacks; but in the normal condition he remembers only normal experiences. By analogy with this state (which arises spontaneously) L. gives the name of "condition seconde