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]  dispute, but I cannot see that this necessarily implies that they are included in a Universal Consciousness, or even that such a consciousness exists. Such a reflective consciousness is not necessary to constitute truth. The twelfth lecture is the most important and original part of the book. He here applies his idealistic theory to the problems of cosmology and freedom, and the treatment is highly suggestive. Facts which belong to the world in space and time, and to which we apply the categories, he calls the "World of Description." The world of spiritual facts on the other hand which is not subject to the categories of the external world, he denominates the "World of Appreciation." "What I see and describe is simply the physical, the phenomenal aspect of the inner and appreciative life." The mind does not influence the body, but the body is only a translation of the mind into the describable language of space. It is to be hoped that the author will work out the results which are only indicated here with more fulness. His solution of the problem of Freedom is, in the condensed form in which it is here presented, very difficult to understand. "As parts of an eternal order we do not indeed choose this thing or that in time, but help to choose out and out what world this fatal temporal world shall eternally be and have been." These seem like words without meaning, but it is doubtless unfair to criticise such a general indication of position. The last chapter of the book is a discussion of the moral order of the universe, and the rational attitude towards life. Professor Royce is no shallow or sentimental optimist, who shuts his eyes to the real evil of the world. The only optimism worthy of a brave man is that which recognizes sin and evil as a part of the real world, and yet wills that these shall be overcome, with a faith that the Infinite Spirit upon whom the world depends is rational. In conclusion, I would like to call attention to the excellent workmanship and attractive form of this book, which add not a little to its charm.



The problem this book faces is the old one of a principle which unifies the subjective and the objective elements in experience: the author says the means by which he tries to solve it have some claims to originality but not to novelty. Dr. Avenarius says that a knowledge of his Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung is necessary with a view to a judgment upon this volume, but is not indispensable to its understanding. The real point that Der Menschliche Weltbegriff tries to answer is whether or not the systematic study or examination of our experience necessarily leads to 