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310 been expected, the breadth of view and clearness of conception, which had won for the earlier volume the cordial recognition of the most eminent psychologists, have here been successfully operative in straightening out some of the "confusion, illusion and relation" which has made the subject of 'Feeling' the dark continent of psychological exploration. And as was to have been expected too, we find not merely a logical arrangement of generally accepted facts and principles, but positive contributions to the science. Still, the work is less to be considered a vehicle for the publication of original views and the results of investigations than as a university text-book, — a function for which the mechanical arrangement of the book, with its copious references to psychological literature, and its 'problems' given at the end of each chapter, well fit it.

At first glance it would seem that a work on the feelings and the will, contained in less than four hundred loosely printed pages, of which eighty-four are given up to a consideration of "The Nervous System" and "The Nervous System and Consciousness," must show either sins of omission or of superficiality. But the fulness of the table of contents would preclude the one, as the scholarship shown in "The Senses and Intellect" would make the latter impossible. Condensation is obtained partly through compactness of statement, partly through the free use of space-saving technical terms. Of the need "of the latter in Psychology there is no doubt, not alone to save time and space, but to replace or set aside the traditional, popular terms with their many colorings of meanings. But it seems to us that in this respect the author has gone a trifle too far, — his pages bristle with 'coefficients' of all kinds — coefficients of reality, of belief, of right — coefficients ethical, æsthetical and logical.

It must not be forgotten too, that at this stage of Psychology, full, clear descriptions of the contents of consciousness are desirable, even at the risk of clumsiness of construction, and that time and space-saving terms are, even for practical psychologists, too apt to be thought-saving terms. As Mill says, "We must ever be living in habitual contemplation of the phenomena themselves, and not resting in our familiarity with the words which express them." Further condensation is effected by the frequent use of compact general statements without much illustration — a practice which we surmise will make the book fairly hard reading for those whose training has been limited to the usual collegiate term of Psychology. This is not saying that Professor Baldwin has not carefully thought out what he has to say, and expressed his thoughts with clearness, but it does mean that he who reads this book with understanding will have to supply no small amount of context out of the works to which references are given.