Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/300



HERE is a very important philosophical distinction, the A neglect of which has, we think, been at the root of much of the discussion in recent years on vital topics such as e.g. that of the "conflict between science and religion"; the distinction, namely, between natural science and the philosophy of nature. It is frequently assumed that natural science comprises in itself all knowledge of nature, and even all real knowledge whatever; that natural science is a perfectly independent, an absolute, domain of knowledge. This assumption is not philosophically justifiable; nor, indeed, has it been made universally by physicists of name and real standing.

An idea of the meaning and importance of the distinction between natural science and the philosophy of nature, may be gained — by way of introduction — by a glance at the history of modern thought, as regards the distinction. English philosophers have, it is scarcely necessary to say, pretty generally followed the example of Bacon, and adopted the advice of Newton, who warned physicists to "beware of metaphysics," in identifying the philosophy of nature with natural science, as, indeed, is obvious from the universal use by Englishmen of the term "natural philosophy" to designate physical investigation generally. The continental philosophers, who, instead of eschewing metaphysics have cultivated it, have (with the exception of the French as a rule) pretty generally distinguished between natural science as empirico-mathematical investigation of the physical universe, and the philosophy of nature as the speculative discussion of the foundation-principles of all thought about physical existence. They have assumed that, underlying and conditioning empirico-mathematical natural science, are certain speculative notions concerning space, time, motion, Rh