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Rh hand to the scientific, and on the other hand to the moral and religious consciousness. The former aspect of his philosophy is thrown into relief when he urges that there is nothing in the actions of man, in so far as they are regarded as events, which entitles us to claim for them exemption from the universal law of causation; the latter aspect is emphasized when it is maintained that, in his real or ultimate nature, man is a free being over whom the law of causation has no sway. Here we have the opposition of the phenomenal and the real exhibited in its most striking form. How did Kant reconcile to himself what seems to be a flat contradiction?

Take any action you please, and you will find, according to Kant, that its place in the chain of events is as unalterably determined as the fall of a stone, or the motion of a projectile through space. Let the action be, say, the relieving of distress. Setting aside the physical movements which precede the consciousness that a certain person stands in need of relief, and the physical movements by which the action is carried into effect, there remains for consideration simply a series of mental events, which will be found to be connected together in a fixed order of dependence. Following upon the perception of the object, there arises in the consciousness of the agent a desire to relieve distress. This desire would not arise at all, did not the agent possess a peculiar form of susceptibility; namely, that of pity at the sight of human suffering. Now, this susceptibility is a part of his sensuous nature, which he can neither make nor unmake. Not every one is so affected, or affected in the same degree. Clearly, therefore, the desire to relieve distress is an event, occurring at a certain moment, and following upon the idea of another's pain as certainly as any other event that can be named. If the desire is so strong that the agent determines to relieve the other's distress, we have a further sequence of a certain volition upon a certain desire; and this, like all other sequences, is subject to the law of causality. The most rigid determinist has evidently no reason so far to complain of any want of "vigor and rigor" in Kant's doctrine. Of that doctrine it is a striking feature that it puts the mental series of